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  Abstract 
Executive pay regulation is widely discussed as a measure to reduce financial 
mismanagement in corporations. We show that the professional team sports industry, the only 
industry with substantial experience in the regulation of compensation arrangements, provides 
valuable insights for the regulation of executive pay. Based on the experience from professional 
sports leagues, we develop implications for the corporate sector regarding the establishment and 
enforcement of executive pay regulation as well as the level, structure, and rigidity of such 
regulatory measures.
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The  year  2007  marked  the  beginning  of  the  worst  financial  crisis  since  the  Great 
Depression. Most of the world’s largest banks were on the verge of bankruptcy and 
survived  only  due  to  unprecedented  bailout  measures.  Currently,  regulators, 
shareholders, and managers are searching for measures to avoid such a crisis in the 
future. One of the most prominent proposals is the introduction of salary caps for 
corporate executives. The European Union has introduced caps on bankers’ bonuses, 
which will be in effect starting in 2011. The US House of Representatives has ordered 
regulators to set compensation rules, just as the Federal Reserve is pushing for a 
modification of top executive compensation, especially in the banking sector.  
The objective of executive pay arrangements is the alignment of shareholder and 
executive  interests  (Jensen  &  Murphy  (1990),  Bebchuk  &  Fried  (2003)).  Research 
focuses on executive compensation as an instrument to overcome agency problems 
(for  surveys  of  the  vast  number  of  contributions,  see  Gomez-Mejia  &  Wiseman 
(1997), Murphy (1999), Core, Guay & Larcker (2003), and Devers et al. (2007)). The 
recent financial crisis and the related bailout measures suggest that discussion of 
executive  compensation  should  also  include  the  eventual  consequences  of  firm 
behavior  on  taxpayers  and  society.  Potential  instruments  to  moderate  the 
relationship between executives, shareholders, and taxpayers, e.g., pay limits or taxes 
on  excessive  compensation,  have  not  received  much  attention  from  research  (see 
Bebchuk  &  Spamann  (2010)  and  Faulkender,  Kadyrzhanova,  Prabhala  &  Senbet 
(2010), for two of the few examples). Although executive pay played an important 
role in the recent financial crisis, academic research has not analyzed the desired 
attributes, mechanisms, and implementation issues of pay regulation in corporations 
so far.  
The scarce research on executive pay regulation yields few implications for academic 
research as well as for implementation in practice. Professional sports leagues, with 
their experience in determining, implementing and enforcing salary caps and luxury 
taxes, are a unique resource for deriving insights for the corporate sector. In this 
paper, we illustrate what regulators, shareholders and managers can learn from pay 
regulation in major sports leagues. We analyze regulation through salary caps and 
luxury taxes in professional sports leagues and derive implications for executive pay 
regulation. In sports, salary caps, the maximum amount a team can spend on player 
salaries, and luxury taxes, taxes on excess salary payments, have a long tradition. 
Examples  of  sports  leagues  with  salary  regulation  are  numerous:  the  National   4 
Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL) and the National 
Hockey League (NHL) each have a salary cap. Major League Baseball (MLB), as well 
as the NBA, have implemented a luxury tax. 
In  our  analysis  we  employ  the  analogy  between  professional  team  sports  and 
corporations, where we consider team owners and shareholders, and star athletes 
and corporate executives as analogues. We show that self-regulation initiatives can 
improve financial stability of national economies but that regulatory monitoring and 
enforcement  are  necessary.  Additionally,  international  coordination  of  regulation 
efforts are vital to mitigate problems with the effectiveness of pay regulation arising 
in  open  markets.  Our  analysis  further  yields  that  collective  bargaining  reduces 
managerial  power  in  the  pay-setting  process  and  mitigates  the  necessity  for 
government  intervention.  We  also  establish  that  pay  regulation  contingent  on 
performance  in  combination  with  retained  compensation  is  the  more  effective 
regulatory model compared to an absolute cap. We further show that pay regulation 
of  collectives  yields  a  trade-off  between  the  desired  regulatory  effect  and  firms’ 
autonomy  of  setting  individual  compensation.  A  comparison  of  salary  caps  and 
luxury taxes shows that luxury taxes can be an advantageous alternative to salary 
caps. Luxury taxes reduce the net benefit of excessive compensation. Additionally, 
they  lead  to  less  distortions  than  salary  caps  and  generate  resources  for 
redistribution. Contrasting hard and soft regulation, we find that soft regulation is 
less effective in limiting compensation but incentivizes continuity in performance. 
Finally, we argue that the enforcement of pay regulation is just as important in the 
corporate world as in the sports sector, and requires analogous degrees of control 
and penalties.  
The  remainder  of  this  article  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  II  introduces  the 
peculiar economics of professional team sports and outlines the major differences 
between the professional team sports industry and traditional sectors. In Section III, 
we approach selected regulatory issues in executive compensation. We consider the 
insights  gained  from  experience  in  professional  team  sports  leagues  to  discuss 
fundamental questions related to the introduction and workings of salary caps and 
luxury taxes on executive compensation. Section IV concludes.   5 
II. SALARY REGULATION IN PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 
The professional team sports industry differs from traditional business sectors in a 
number of ways. Two particular economic peculiarities of professional team sports 
have led to the regulation of player salaries: competitive imbalance and the ruinous 
escalation of player salaries (Fort & Quirk (1995), Szymanski (2003)). First, there is a 
difference in professional sports between athletic and economic competition. From 
an  athletic  perspective,  opposing  teams  are  competitors.  From  an  economic 
perspective,  however,  they  are  complementors.  A  single  team  cannot  produce  a 
marketable product. It needs at least one opponent. In team sports, leagues aggregate 
a  number  of  teams  and  matches  to  produce  a  championship  race.  Fans  prefer  to 
attend matches with an uncertain outcome and enjoy close championship races (See 
Rottenberg  (1956),  Szymanski  (2001),  Borland  &  MacDonald  (2003),  Fort  &  Lee 
(2007)). Unlike enterprises such as General Electric, Wal-Mart, or Microsoft, which 
benefit from weak competitors in their respective industries, the New York Yankees, 
the Los Angels Lakers, and Real Madrid need strong competitors to maximize their 
revenues. 
A  further  economic  peculiarity  of  professional  team  sports  is  the  associative 
character  of  competition.  No  club  can  improve  its  position  in  the  ranks  without 
simultaneously worsening the position of at least one other team. The position of a 
team in the ranks is closely related to the team’s financial success because teams with 
a better position receive more attention from fans, the media, sponsors, etc. The rank-
order contest between teams may result in a rat race (Akerlof (1976)). As Whitney 
(1993) shows, teams tend to overbid each other for playing talent until they are close 
to bankruptcy. Recent developments in club finance in European football support 
this  hypothesis.  Many  clubs  are  facing  financial  ruin  after  gambling  on  spiraling 
wages (Arnaut (2006), Dietl & Franck (2007), Deloitte & Touche (2009)). 
Salary caps and luxury taxes, which are a surcharge on the part of a team’s payroll 
that  exceeds  a  salary  threshold,  emerged  in  the  US  major  leagues  with  the 
introduction  of  free  agency  and  were  installed  as  a  counterforce  to  free  player 
movement (Fort & Quirk (1995), Dietl, Lang & Rathke (2010a)).
1 The definition of 
salary  caps  and  luxury  taxes  in  collective  bargaining  agreements  leads  to  an 


























































1.  The  reserve  clause  was  introduced  in  baseball  in  1887  and  gave  club  owners  an  exclusive  option  to 
unilaterally renew the annual contracts of their players, binding them to their clubs until release, retirement or 
trade. In contrast, “free agents“ are players for whom no compensation is required and/or the original team 
has no matching rights. Therefore, free agents can freely offer their services to other teams.   6 
sports  leagues  are  often  considered  as  profit-maximizing  cartels,  where  pay 
regulation transfers rents from players to owners.  
Currently,  all  four  North  American  major  team  sports  leagues  have  a  salary  cap 
and/or luxury tax. The NBA in 1983 became the first league to introduce a salary cap 
and has a salary cap of US$ 57.7 million for the 2009/10 season. This cap limits the 
mount of money a team may spend on player salaries. In recent years, the salary cap 
has increased proportionally to the increase in the NBA’s revenues. The NBA salary 
cap  is  a  so-called  “soft”  cap,  meaning  that  in  contrast  to  a  “hard”  cap,  there  are 
several exceptions that allow teams to exceed the salary cap to sign players. These 
exceptions are mainly designed to enable teams to retain popular players. In 1999, 
the NBA also introduced a luxury tax system for those teams with an average team 
payroll exceeding the salary cap by a predefined amount. These teams have to pay a 
100% tax to the league for each dollar that their payroll exceeds the tax level. In the 
NFL, the “hard” salary cap in 2009 was US$ 128 million per team. The NHL operates 
with a hard salary cap such that each team has to spend less than US$ 56.8 million on 
player salaries in the 2009/10 season. The MLB does not have a salary cap. However, 
Major League Baseball became the first league to introduce a luxury tax in 1996 as 
part of its collective bargaining agreement. The threshold at which the luxury tax 
accrues was US$ 162 million per team in the 2009 season. It is important to note that 
there is significant heterogeneity between the major leagues regarding the design of 
salary caps (individual caps, rookie caps, etc.; for a comprehensive overview see, e.g., 
Kaplan, 2004).  
There is wide agreement in the literature that salary caps and luxury taxes improve 
competitive balance in sports leagues because they prevent wealthy clubs with high 
market potential from bidding the full marginal value for additional talent (Fort & 
Quirk  (1995),  Rosen  &  Sanderson  (2001)).  This  effect  allows  less  wealthy,  small-
market  clubs  to  retain  star  players.  Additionally,  salary  caps  can  enhance  social 
welfare  when  they  limit  large  teams’  spending  (Dietl,  Lang  &  Rathke  (2009)). 
Moreover,  a  salary  cap  balances  the  salary  distribution  between  players  and 
increases club profits (Késenne (2000)). The welfare effect of luxury taxes is positive 
because league quality increases as a result of the combination of luxury taxes and 
redistribution  of  luxury  tax  proceeds  (Dietl,  Lang  &  Werner  (2010b)).    However, 
teams  have  incentives  to  circumvent  regulation  through  salary  caps  and  luxury 
taxes, therefore monitoring and enforcement activities are necessary (Fort & Quirk 
(1995), Dobson & Goddard (2001)).    7 
 
III. INSIGHTS ON PAY REGULATION FROM MAJOR SPORTS LEAGUES  
This article illustrates regulation practices in the professional team sports industry 
and derives insights for the corporate sector. We have shown how the necessity for 
regulation  in  professional  team  sports  comes  from  two  peculiarities  of  the  sports 
sector: the preference for balanced competition and the consequences of a rank-order 
tournament. It is important to note that the corporate sector does not share these 
peculiarities. Competitors in a sector, for example finance companies, do not prefer 
balanced competition but want to outperform their competitors. Only on very few 
occasions, banks are also complementors. For example, liquid financial institutions 
have  incentives  to  support  their  competitors,  for  instance  by  private  bailouts,  to 
avoid contagion from illiquid banks (Leitner (2005)). In general, however, a bank 
prefers  weak  competitors.  The  rank-order  tournament  observed  in  sports  leagues 
does not exist in the same form in the corporate sector. Firms who outperform their 
competitors do not harm direct competitors to an analogous degree as it is the case in 
sports leagues.  
These  observations  show  that  the  rationales  for  pay  regulation  in  major  sports 
leagues do not exist in other industries. Consequently, the analysis of professional 
team  sports  cannot  resolve  the  controversy  over  the  need  for  executive  pay 
regulation. Beyond this limitation, however, major sports leagues can offer valuable 
insights into what characterizes effective regulation of compensation. We therefore 
analyze  regulation  practices  in  major  sports  leagues  and  point  out  potential 
implications of these practices for the corporate sector.  
 
1. (Self-)Imposed rules ensure the common benefit of competitors  
Consider the following anecdote of an Englishman observing the process of riverboat 
towing in 19
th century China. At that time, wooden boats were used to carry natural 
resources from inland China downstream to large coastal cities. After unloading, the 
empty boats were pulled back upstream by a group of men from the riverbank using 
a  large  tow.  The  Englishman  was  surprised  when  he  saw  that  the  men  where 
whipped  whenever  they  slacked  down  in  their  towing  effort.  He  was  shocked, 
however, when he learned that the men pulling the boat actually were the owners of 
the  boat  and  had  agreed  to  hire  a  monitor  to  whip  them  whenever  necessary 
(Cheung (1983)).   8 
Owners of professional sports teams face a similar dilemma as the riverboat towers. 
The owners profit from fan attention and to generate and maintain interest in sports 
competition,  they  want  to  ensure  balanced  competition.  Consequently,  different 
teams’  payrolls  and  the  resulting  talent  levels  should  be  similar.  Apart  from  this 
collective objective, individual team owners profit from a high league rank of their 
team. Because of the rank-order contest in professional team sports, the threat of an 
arms  race  emerges.  So  while  the  collective  of  club  owners  prefers  balanced 
competition,  each  individual  club  owner  tries  to  hire  more  talent  by  increasing 
his/her team’s payroll in an effort to move up in the ranking. In the end, all owners 
end  up  with  higher  payrolls  without  improving  their  individual  ranks.  Like  the 
Chinese  riverboat  towers,  club  owners  are  aware  of  the  dangers  abandoning 
common  objectives  and  impose  restrictions  on  themselves,  for  example  the 
regulation of players’ salaries (Fort & Quirk (1995)). They are also aware that each 
owner has an incentive to circumvent these payroll restrictions. Consequently, they 
also  hire  a  monitor,  the  league  authority,  to  ensure  that  the  restrictions  will  be 
enforced (Franck (2003)). 
Major sports leagues have reacted to the awareness that their business model can 
only  be  successful  in  the  long  run  if  they  maintain  self-imposed  restrictions.  In 
contrast  to  the  corporate  sector,  the  closed  structure  of  major  sports  leagues 
additionally  favors  the  effectiveness  of  self-regulation.  Major  sports  leagues  are 
focused on a small, homogeneous geographic region and team composition within a 
league  is  very  stable.  The  coordinated  self-regulation  of  teams  in  major  sports 
leagues leads to financial stability as well as solid rents for owners and players (Fort 
(2003)). Teams understand that the collective discipline of a number of parties with 
similar interests is necessary to provide a basis for this successful coordination and 
therefore are willing to yield some of their autonomy.
2  
Additionally,  professional  sports  teams  are  in  a  unique  position  with  respect  to 
employment opportunities for star athletes. No sports league (in the disciplines of 
American football, baseball, basketball, and ice hockey) outside North America can 
compete  with  the  major  leagues  financially  and  with  respect  to  public  attention. 
Consequently, star players do not have significant outside options. LeBron James of 
the  Miami  Heat  cannot  simply  leave  the  NBA  and  join  another  league  without 


























































2.  For an analysis of potential anticompetitive consequences of professional sports leagues as joint ventures see 
Flynn & Gilbert (2001).   9 
compensation.
3  Professional  athletes  thus  show  lower  salary  elasticity  than 
executives, and a decrease in salary does not necessarily lead to immediate exit to a 
foreign  league.  In  contrast,  a  bank  executive  could  easily  escape  compensation 
regulation by starting to work for a bank, which is not regulated.  
Despite  these  differences  between  the  corporate  sector  and  major  sports  leagues, 
corporations can learn from the benefits of regulation in professional team sports. 
Corporations  generally  have  concerns  about  regulation  because  of  a  loss  of 
autonomy and the danger of an exit of executives to other economies. To mitigate the 
effects of external regulation, self-regulation of sectors analogous to the practice in 
major  sports  leagues  could  be  an  alternative  to  government  intervention.  Self-
regulation by sectors, for example the banking sector, already is common practice 
(Chatov (1975), Gunningham (1991), Gunningham & Rees (1997)). An extension of 
self-regulation  to  executive  compensation  could  reduce  the  necessity  of  extensive 
government  intervention.  However,  self-regulation  initiatives  for  corporate 
governance by the European Union have shown that they can be successful only if 
mandatory compliance, monitoring and enforcement accompany the initiatives (De 
Jong, DeJong, Mertens & Wasley (2005)). 
The  effectiveness  of  regulation  in  major  sports  leagues  strongly  depends  on  the 
coordination of individual teams to establish and enforce regulatory arrangements. 
Analogously,  strong  coordination  efforts  are  vital  for  effective  regulation,  self-
imposed as well as external, of business sectors and national economies, e.g., to limit 
outside  options  for  executives  by  international  implementation  of  regulatory 
measures (Acharya, Wachtel & Walter (2009)). Although coordination of business 
sectors or whole economies is much more complicated than in professional sports 
leagues, regulators have undertaken various coordination efforts in the recent past. 
The  2009  G-20  summit,  which  had  salary  caps  for  executive  compensation  on  its 
agenda, is one example of concerted effort to avoid executive migration away from 
regulated  economies.  By  including  the  world’s  major  economies,  the  exit  of 
executives from these economies could be mitigated. The introduction of compulsory 
caps on bankers’ bonuses in the EU also mirrors that regulators understand the need 
for  concerted  efforts  in  compensation  regulation.  To  avoid  compensation-related 



























































3.  According to Forbes.com, James earned US$ 40m in 2009, of which US$ 16m were salary payments by his 
team.   10 
2. Collective bargaining ensures sustainable operations 
In  professional  team  sports,  salary  caps  and  luxury  taxes  are  established  via 
collective bargaining between the players union and the team owners. Both sides 
negotiate  general  work  conditions,  including  the  maximum  (and  in  some  cases 
minimum)  percentage  of  league  revenues,  which  players  can  receive  as  salaries 
(Késenne  (2007)).  As  this  percentage  is  established  via  a  collective  agreement, 
antitrust  law  cannot  be  applied  to  the  bargaining  outcome,  including  the  salary 
regulations  (Jacobs  &  Winter  (1971),  Marburger  (1997)).  Many  other  ways  of 
regulating salaries, such as the dictation of salary caps by team owners, would be 
prohibited by antitrust law (Rosner & Shropshire (2004)).  
The  North  American  major  leagues  show  that  collective  bargaining  between 
principals and high-income agents can ensure sustainable levels of compensation as 
well as financial stability of a league and its teams. The collective bargaining process 
allows  both  team  owners  and  players  to  voice  their  interests  and  continue  the 
bargaining until they reach a bilateral agreement. Homogeneous interests give team 
owners an advantageous bargaining position opposite to the players, who face more 
coordination problems because of their number and the resulting range of interests. 
In contrast, player talent shows low substitutability and supply of skilled labor in the 
past was limited, which gave the players an advantage (Rosen & Sanderson (2001)). 
However, at present major sports leagues’ increasingly global sourcing of playing 
talent worsens players’ bargaining position. In the case that an agreement on a salary 
cap or luxury tax cannot be established, a strike (by the players) or lockout (by the 
teams) may occur. This can result in the partial or entire loss of a season, as has 
occurred  in  the  recent  past,  for  example  in  the  1998/99  NBA  and  2004/05  NHL 
lockouts (Staudohar (1999, 2005)). The forgone earnings related to lockouts pressure 
both team owners and players to reach an agreement. 
Collective  bargaining  in  major  sports  leagues  provides  insights  for  executive 
compensation in the corporate sector. Collective bargaining between shareholders 
and  executives  can  increase  shareholder  participation  in  the  setting  of  executive 
compensation and reduces managerial power in the compensation setting process 
(Bebchuk,  Fried  &  Walker  (2002),  Bebchuk  &  Fried  (2003)).  Therefore,  collective 
bargaining  reduces  excessive  compensation.  However,  if  shareholders  and 
executives collectively bargained over compensation arrangements, they would not 
include  perspectives  outside  the  scope  of  their  interests.  Regulatory  intervention 
would  thus  still  be  necessary  to  eliminate  incentives  with  potentially  harmful   11 
external  effects  (Bebchuk  &  Spamann  (2010)).  The  regulator,  as  the  controlling 
instance, has to ensure that shareholders and executives do not disregard taxpayer 
interests.  
The bargaining parties in professional sports leagues are team owners and players. 
For the corporate sector, the choice of bargaining parties is not as obvious. Collective 
bargaining could take place between shareholders and executives within one firm, 
within one sector, or within national or international boundaries. The coordination 
costs of a collective bargaining process rise with the spread and sector specificity of 
bargaining parties. The regulator has to address this conflict between coordination 
costs  and  the  comprehensiveness  of  the  bargaining  outcome.  Professional  sports 
teams allocate large fractions of total revenues to a small number of employees with 
highly developed sector-specific skills. The process of collective bargaining, which 
has proven useful in the sports sector, may thus be most effective in business sectors 
displaying  a  similar  personnel  quality  and  salary  structure,  such  as  investment 
banks, hedge funds, and businesses organized as professional partnerships (Levin & 
Tadelis (2005)).  
Recent  changes  in  executive  pay  policies  toward  more  shareholder  influence 
underline  the  relevance  of  the  principle  of  collective  bargaining  in  the  corporate 
environment. The “Say on Pay” initiatives in, e.g., the US and the UK support this 
impression. These initiatives aim at introducing the right for shareholders to vote on 
executive  compensation  proposals  and  have  achieved  this  in  several  major 
economies already (Minder (2007), Cavanagh & Sadler (2009), Dew-Becker (2009), 
Conyon  &  Sadler  (2010)).  Other  proposals,  for  example  advisory  say  on  pay  by 
shareholders  and  full  independence  of  compensation  committees  also  aim  at 
reducing managerial power in the process of compensation setting, emphasizing the 
importance of arms-length bargaining over compensation arrangements (Bebchuk & 
Fried (2006)). 
 
3. Collective regulatory measures are effective when performance is transparent 
All  North  American  major  sports  leagues  operate  with  collective  pay  regulation. 
There are salary caps and luxury taxes for entire teams.
4 These collective measures 
ensure the financial viability of team operations because they determine total salary 


























































4.  Individual pay regulation only occurs, when a league allows exceptions to the collective measure and there is 
the danger of excessive individual player salaries.   12 
allocate the total amount defined by the salary cap to individual players (Staudohar 
(1998)). An NFL team, for example, might invest the full amount of the salary cap in 
the  quarterback  and  employ  cheap  players  for  all  other  positions.  At  another 
extreme, it might pay each player an identical salary. In general, given constraints 
such as the availability of talent, conformity to league rules about acquiring players 
of  opponents,  and  other  side  restrictions,  teams  are  free  to  make  their  optimal 
decisions.  
However,  this  freedom  of  salary  distribution  does  not  lead  to  arbitrariness  in  a 
team’s  decision-making.  Teams  consider  different  aspects  such  as  their  league 
standing, fan demand and advertisers’ preference for team success and star players 
when they make their decisions on how much to spend on whom (Scully (1974), 
Scully (2004)). Consequently, the freedom of allocation of the salary cap in general 
does not lead to extreme allocations and is also an important instrument for teams to 
adjust to the preferences of their stakeholders (Frick, Prinz & Winkelmann (2003), 
DeBrock, Hendricks & Koenker (2004)). 
Individual athlete performance is observable and quantifiable, which is an important 
determinant  of  the  effectiveness  of  collective  pay  regulation  in  professional  team 
sports.  Consequently,  as  there  are  no  incentives  to  shirk  when  compensation 
includes continuous information on the past marginal product, the largest proportion 
of players’ compensation comes from their base salaries (in analogy to Fama (1980)); 
performance-related  pay  only  constitutes  an  insignificant  percentage  of  player 
salaries.
 Athletes earn their contracted salary independent of their scoring average or 
their teams’ win percentage. One vital extrinsic incentive for athletes to perform well 
is  related  to  long-term  career  concerns:  strong  performance  improves  a  player’s 
bargaining power in future contracts. The weight of this incentive, in combination 
with  intrinsic  competitive  motivation  and  other  financial  benefits  related  to 
commercial endorsements, renders performance-based pay apart from fixed salaries 
unnecessary  (Krautmann  &  Oppenheimer  (2002)).  These  observations  have  two 
consequences on collective regulation: players do not have incentives for shirking 
under  collective  regulation  and  regulation  is  facilitated  because  compensation 
arrangements have a simple structure. Experience from major sports leagues implies 
that collective salary regulation limits excessive compensation and at the same time 
preserves teams’ autonomy in allocating individual compensation.  
Regulators can learn from collective pay regulation in professional team sports. Just 
as athletic competition ensures that a quarterback has strong teammates, executive   13 
pay would not be concentrated on a single individual, neglecting other positions in 
executive  boards.  Instead,  a  collective  salary  cap  enables  an  allocation  of 
compensation aligned with each firm’s objectives. If regulators dictate a corporation 
how much to spend on each executive, this eliminates the corporation’s capacity to 
act optimally contingent on the market situation and to address agency problems 
(Eisenhardt  (1989),  Carpenter  &  Sanders  (2002)).  The  regulator,  apart  from  the 
regulation  objective,  has  to  consider  this  dependence  of  corporations  on  their 
autonomy (Cyert, Kang & Kumar (2002)). Collective instead of individual regulatory 
arrangements could therefore be a less restrictive alternative of regulating executive 
pay.  
Compared to professional team sports, where athlete performance is observable, an 
executive’s  contribution  to  firm  performance  is  less  transparent.  Most  empirical 
studies  thus  focus  on  executive  compensation  and  firm  performance,  and  not 
individual  performance  (see  Murphy  (1985),  Murphy  (1986),  Jensen  &  Murphy 
(1990), Gibbons & Murphy (1992); Bushman, Indjejikian & Smith (1996) outline the 
problems related to individual executive performance and compensation). Although 
the individual performance of executives is difficult to measure, performance-pay 
constitutes a substantial fraction of total compensation. Collective pay regulation, for 
example  a  pay  limit  for  the  executive  board,  would  not  infringe  this  practice. 
However, the allocation of regulated pay could lead to conflicts over who receives 
what  part.  Such  conflicts  also  exist  without  pay  regulation,  but  are  intensified 
because binding regulation reduces available pay.  
In the discussion of collective pay regulation it is important to note that in contrast to 
professional team sports there is no fixed size of executive boards. Consequently, 
adequate collective regulatory measures for different sizes of executive boards are 
necessary to guarantee uniform treatment of individual firms. The regulator has to 
consider the resulting room for manipulation, because corporations could appoint 
dummy  members  of  the  executive  board  to  mitigate  regulatory  restrictions,  for 
example.  
Experience from major sports leagues shows that collective regulatory arrangements 
can limit excessive compensation. It is not straightforward to see, whether they can 
also  incentivize  executives  to  take  fewer  decisions  with  negative  externalities  on 
society. Individual measures can achieve this objective more accurately. However, 
they  strongly  impair  corporations’  autonomy  in  setting  executive  pay.  This   14 
autonomy  is  vital  for  corporations,  and  there  is  an  essential  trade-off  between 
corporate autonomy and regulatory accuracy. 
 
4.  Pay  regulation  contingent  on  performance  with  retained  compensation  correcting  for 
substandard performance reduces focus on short run 
In the major leagues, pay regulation in the form of salary caps and luxury taxes of 
both absolute and relative nature can be found. An absolute salary cap, e.g., can be 
understood  as  a  limit  to  compensation  defined  independently  of  financial 
performance,  i.e.  it  is  a  fixed  amount  of  money.  A  relative  salary  cap,  the 
predominant  form  of  salary  regulation,  can  be  defined  as  the  proportion  of  a 
financial  statistic  such  as  revenue  or  profits.  In  this  case,  financial  indicators 
determine the actual extent of the regulatory measure. In the major sports leagues, 
salary  caps  for  entire  teams  are  set  relative  to  projected  league  revenues  of  the 
current season (Marburger (2006), Dietl, et al. (2009)). For instance, in the NBA, teams 
and  players  have  agreed  upon  a  payroll  cap  for  each  team  of  51%  of  projected 
basketball-related  income  of  the  league  (BRI,  i.e.,  gate  revenues,  TV  contracts, 
merchandizing, and others), divided by the 30 teams in the league. In the MLB, as 
another example, the luxury tax threshold is independent of revenues.  
Salary  caps  for  individual  players,  as  they  exist  in  the  NBA,  can  be  relative  or 
absolute in nature. The individual salary cap for an NBA player is contingent on the 
number of years he has played in the league and on the payroll cap. The longer a 
player’s tenure in the NBA, the higher is his individual cap. Additionally, the cap is 
either a fixed amount or a percentage of the payroll cap, whichever figure is higher. 
Note that in the past, the fixed amount was always smaller than the percentage of the 
total payroll. This shows that absolute salary caps do exist but are not binding if 
there is a choice between an absolute and a relative cap. The other North American 
major leagues considered in this work show analogous patterns with respect to the 
choice between absolute and relative salary caps. 
The dominance of a salary cap in proportion of total league revenues stems from a 
number  of  advantages:  a  salary  cap  of  this  form  aligns  team  owner  and  player 
interests, because players face less restrictive caps when the league is more successful 
financially.  At  the  same  time,  this  practice  ensures  a  league’s  financial  viability 
because salary payments are limited to a proportion of total earnings. Additionally, if 
total earnings fall short of projections, there are mechanisms which ensure that teams   15 
do not have to pay salaries that exceed their actual earnings. For example, the so-
called escrow system allows teams to withhold eight to ten percent of player salaries 
until actual BRI is known. The withheld money in the league’s escrow account is 
only paid to the players if BRI meets projections.   
In  the  corporate  sector,  opinions  diverge  over  whether  executive  pay  should  be 
capped at a certain absolute amount or whether it should be capped relative to a 
company’s earnings. The Obama administration suggested a $500,000 salary cap on 
yearly cash compensation for executives in firms receiving TARP funds. The heads of 
state of England, France, and Germany have discussed the introduction of salary 
caps for executives, which are determined relative to a company’s revenues.  
The  dependence  of  pay  arrangements  on  performance  measures  influences  risk-
taking  behavior.  Excessive  risk-taking  by  executives  and  the  related  lack  of 
consideration for future consequences of present decisions is a vital topic in current 
discussion over executive compensation (Bebchuk & Spamann (2010), Faulkender, et 
al.  (2010)).  Major  sports  leagues  imply  that  pay  regulation  should  refer  to  actual 
performance, but also that the regulator should be able to adapt pay levels in cases 
where overall sector performance is below expectations. In the case of professional 
team sports, a salary cap that allows for stricter limits if league revenues turn out 
lower than projected ensures financial viability of present and future operations. In 
the  corporate  sector,  such  regulation  allows  executives  to  enhance  their  earnings 
through strong performance, similar to current practice of performance pay and in 
line  with  incentive  theory  (Murphy  (1999),  Conyon  (2006)).  Additionally,  the 
regulator retains a percentage of compensation until a future date. Such an escrow 
system effects that executives take long-term consequences of their decisions into 
consideration.  
Performance of professional athletes does not have long-term consequences on team 
performance. In contrast, an executive’s decisions can influence firm performance for 
years. This difference is important when considering retained earnings, because the 
period  of  time  for  which  the  regulator  retains  a  percentage  of  earnings  should 
depend on the permanence of executive decisions. The longer the effects of decisions 
persist in the future, the longer the period of maintaining the escrow account should 
turn out. 
In response to the financial crisis, the European Union has introduced a deferment of 
several years of a percentage of bonus payments for banking executives beginning 
2011. Such a measure is analogous to a pay regulation relative to performance: the   16 
bonus may be cancelled in case that the banks’ financial situation deteriorates in the 
future. Consequently, there is a safeguard for negative future developments as well 
as  the  incentive  for  decision-making  which  integrates  financially  sustainable 
performance.  
 
5. Luxury taxes lead to higher efficiency of talent allocation than salary caps 
The  major  leagues  show  different  approaches  to  the  limitation  of  player  salaries, 
involving both salary caps and luxury taxes. The NFL, for example, operates with a 
salary cap. The league has to approve all contracts between a team and a player; 
therefore, the salary cap cannot be exceeded. The MLB, on the other hand, operates 
with a luxury tax. In the NBA, a combination of a salary cap and a luxury tax is in 
place. If a team’s payroll for players exceeds the luxury tax threshold, which is set 
above the salary cap, it has to pay a tax to the league for the overage. These examples 
show that in professional sports the different measures achieve similar objectives 
(Dietl, et al. (2010b)).  
A salary cap sets a strict limit on total compensation per team or per player. As a 
result,  teams’  expenditures  on  talent  converge.  This  leads  to  an  improved 
competitive  balance,  but  also  to  an  inefficient  allocation  of  talent.  Players  do  not 
necessarily play for the team where their marginal productivity yields the highest 
return. In leagues with comparatively few games per season (e.g., an NFL team has 
16 regular season games), the inefficient allocation of talent does not lead to forgone 
revenues. Almost all teams sell out all games. Other leagues have many more games, 
an MLB team, for example, has 162 regular season games. Consequently, it is more 
difficult  to  fill  the  stadium  at  every  game,  especially  in  large  markets  where 
alternatives abound. Large-market teams have to field stars to fill their stadia. In 
terms of the allocation of players with respect to their marginal return, these leagues 
require higher efficiency, i.e., the best players should play in the largest markets. 
Under the MLB’s luxury tax, rich teams can spend more on players than small teams, 
with the restraint that a luxury tax accrues. Given that large-market teams have a 
higher marginal return on talent, this leads to a more efficient allocation of playing 
talent. In this sense, the luxury tax is economically superior to the salary cap (Rosen 
&  Sanderson  (2001)).  From  an  economic  perspective,  this  could  explain  different 
regulatory regimes in different leagues (Scully (2004)).    17 
Luxury taxes show another important difference to salary caps: while they do not 
imply a strict salary limit, they generate tax revenues from teams that exceed the 
luxury tax threshold. The league can redistribute these tax revenues among smaller 
teams  or  use  the  revenues  for  pursuing  collective  league  interests  apart  from 
balanced competition.  
Corporate executives should also earn according to their marginal product to ensure 
efficiency (Fama (1980)). Consequently, considering current practice in major sports 
leagues, a mechanism similar to the luxury tax in sports is preferable over a salary 
cap. A luxury tax allows pay according to an executive’s performance and the value 
the  executive  adds  to  a  firm.  The  tax  controls  pay  by  increasing  a  firm’s  cost  of 
executive pay, therefore there is a regulating effect. Luxury tax payments generate 
resources  the  regulator  can  redistribute  or  save  in  a  fund  for  financial  relief 
programs.  However,  a  measure  like  the  luxury  tax  only  makes  overage 
compensation more costly and does not strictly limit it. Salary caps do not allow such 
overage and therefore facilitate regulation.  
In the US, several models of taxing executive compensation in firms, which have 
accepted larger amounts of federal bailout funds, have been discussed. For example, 
the  US  House  of  Representatives  approved  a  90%  tax  on  bonuses  in  such  firms. 
Additionally, many CEO’s have donated their bonuses in times of public criticism of 
their  compensation.  Michael  Geoghegan  of  HSBC,  for  example,  donated  GB£  4 
million  of  his  bonus  in  the  year  2009.  Some  companies  consider  charity  rules  to 
reduce connotations of greed. Goldman Sachs considered obliging its executives to 
donate parts of their bonuses. These donations may be interpreted as a self-imposed 
luxury tax, which incurs only in the case that executive compensation exceeds an 
implicit threshold, defined by public opinion. These cases show that the corporate 
world  already  shows  different  compulsory  and  voluntary  types  of  taxes  on 
compensation.  The  luxury  tax  mechanism  and  its  comparison  to  a  salary  cap 
therefore merit closer attention.  
 
6. Soft salary caps can impede regulation, but also reward experience and successful careers 
In professional team sports, the design of salary caps can take on two forms with 
respect to the rigor of the cap. A salary cap can be hard, that is, fixed and without 
exceptions, or it can be soft, that is, it can be adapted under specific circumstances. 
Hard  salary  caps  in  sports  leagues  ensure  equal  opportunities  for  competitors.   18 
Opponents may freely compete for players subject to the uniform salary cap. All 
competitors in a league face the same salary cap. Soft salary caps allow for individual 
exceptions  to  the  salary  limit  under  certain  conditions.  Teams  can  thus  adapt  to 
specific circumstances and spend more on very important and experienced players, 
for  example.  Soft  salary  caps  are  a  less  effective  measure  because  exceptions  are 
possible, and affected parties will try to exploit all available exceptions in their favor.  
In  the  major  leagues,  hard  caps  as  well  as  soft  caps  can  be  found.  The  NFL,  for 
instance, has a hard cap, meaning that total salaries paid in a season have to be below 
a certain limit. Otherwise, sanctions are imposed on the team that has violated the 
salary cap. The NBA, as another example, has a soft salary cap; a soft cap implies that 
there are numerous exceptions to the general salary limits. These exceptions lead to a 
large  proportion  of  teams  exceeding  the  salary  cap  to  better  adapt  to  team-  and 
player-specific requirements. The NBA makes exceptions so that teams can hold on 
to merited players when their contracts expire. One such exception is named after 
former NBA star Larry Bird. To re-sign him, his team had to exceed the salary cap. 
As  a  consequence,  the  exception  was  introduced  that  a  team  could  re-sign  star 
players who either had played a number of years without being waived (i.e., fired) or 
had not changed teams as a free agent. If these conditions hold, the contract does not 
count towards the salary cap. This so-called “Bird exception” awards the privilege of 
retaining franchise players. Other exceptions, such as the “Early Bird” and “Non-
Bird” exceptions, are installed, which allow moderate salary growth to players who 
have not been waived for two consecutive seasons or remain with their original team 
(for  a  comprehensive  overview  on  exceptions  to  the  NBA  salary  cap,  see  Hill  & 
Groothuis (2001).  
Exceptions reduce the effectiveness of regulatory interventions. Where they apply, 
they relax the restrictions of installed regulations. This can undermine the regulatory 
mechanism to a degree where it becomes virtually ineffective, as the case of the NBA 
has shown. For example, Michael Jordan earned salaries of more than US$ 30m per 
season, where his salary alone would have exceeded the team salary cap. He signed 
these contracts under the Larry Bird exception, therefore they never counted towards 
the cap. Today, the NBA has eliminated this loophole by installing an individual 
salary cap.  
For executive compensation such loopholes would have similar consequences and 
discredit the regulation attempt. However, exceptions also allow the adaptation to 
specific circumstances and may therefore also be used as incentives. In some major   19 
sports  leagues,  merited  players  face  softer  regulation  than  others.  Similarly, 
experienced company executives with a solid career could face less restrictive salary 
caps.  Such  an  exception  incentivizes  present  and  future  executives  to  invest  in 
continuous performance to be able to obtain exception status in the future. This way, 
large  compensation  for  executives  accrues  in  the  future  and  reflects  a  seniority 
principle (Hutchens (1989)). Salary caps could therefore help to render short-term-
oriented, risk-taking behavior less attractive to executives.  
 
7. Enforcement of salary caps and luxury taxes requires detailed information on the structure 
of compensation and strict sanctions in case of transgressions  
When a sports team exceeds the salary cap - and the excess does not fall under one of 
the exceptions in the case of a soft salary cap - sanctions come into effect. Sanctions 
for rule violations are severe once a positive proof is obtained. The punishment may 
take  on  several  forms:  from  financial  penalties  over  suspension  of  the  involved 
player to the loss of draft rights for one or more seasons. Professional team sports 
show that salary caps are only effective to the extent that they are well defined and 
enforceable (Dietl, Franck & Nuesch (2006)).   
In  the  major  leagues,  potential  loopholes  for  circumventing  the  salary  cap  are 
eliminated  by  additional  regulatory  intervention.  Incompliance  with  league  rules, 
once  it  is  discovered,  is  addressed  rigorously.  However,  salary  caps  are 
circumvented  frequently,  and  circumvention  attempts  are  various  (Fort  &  Quirk 
(1995)). One prominent example in the recent past has been the postponing of actual 
salaries to the future by signing undervalued contracts for a period of time until one 
of the salary cap exceptions allows high-value contracts. In essence, incompliance 
with the rules cannot be verified unless there is a written account of the undisclosed 
agreement. This was the case with the professional basketball player Joe Smith and 
his  NBA  team,  the  Minnesota  Timberwolves.  Once  their  written  agreement  over 
illicitly bypassing the salary cap became public, heavy penalties were inflicted on the 
participating parties, that is, to the player, his team, his team’s management, and his 
agent  (Staudohar  (1998)).  The  league  commissioner  voided  Smith’s  contract,  the 
Timberwolves’ senior management was temporarily suspended, the Timberwolves 
had to pay a fine of US$ 3 million, and the team lost future draft rights. Another 
example of concealed practices to impede the enforcement of salary caps are teams 
underreporting revenues to pay lower salaries to their players (e.g., Quirk (1997)).   20 
While  this  practice  keeps  salaries  under  control,  it  may  harm  the  acceptance  of 
collective agreements when it is discovered.  
With regard to a salary cap, firms and executives have similar incentives as those 
faced by professional sports teams and players. Executives prefer higher to lower 
pay, and firms want to attract and retain the best executives available; to attract the 
best executives, the compensation a firm offers also has to be the highest among its 
competitors. Consequently, circumventing the salary cap, although possibly harmful 
in a larger context, may be in the interest of both parties. This yields an exemplary 
situation of a moral hazard (Holmstrom (1982)). Circumvention can be achieved by 
spotting  and  exploiting  potential  loopholes  in  the  salary  cap  mechanisms  or  by 
taking actions incompliant to defined rules, such as concealed agreements over side-
payments or non-monetary compensation.  
To  ensure  adherence  to  the  salary  cap  and  therefore  its  stabilizing  effects,  a 
regulatory entity has to install well-defined rules and enforce compliance with the 
salary cap. This becomes the more difficult, the more complex the pay arrangements 
are. Executive compensation, in contrast to athletes’ pay, is not transparent to the 
general  public.  Additionally,  it  generally  shows  more  components,  for  example 
postretirement payments, which makes it more difficult to control total remuneration 
(Bebchuk & Fried (2006)). Exhaustive categorization and publication of compensation 
components is therefore necessary to enable regulatory authorities to control total 
compensation (See, e.g., Murphy (1999) and Faulkender et al. (2010)). For example, 
the classification and extent of deferred payments and contingent compensation as 
introduced in the EU merits attention.  
Penalties for illicit circumventions have to correspond to the consequences that an 
ineffectiveness  of  the  cap  could  have  (in  analogy  to  Becker  (1968)).  Sanctions  for 
violations  should  be  severe  to  a  degree  analogous  to  professional  sports. 
Additionally,  consequent  monitoring  is  a  vital  subsidiary  for  the  successful 
enforcement of salary caps for executives (Alchian & Demsetz (1972), Fama & Jensen 
(1983)).  
   21 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The  regulation  of  executive  compensation  is  currently  widely  discussed  by 
regulators, shareholders and managers. Fundamental economic analysis of the use 
and potential consequences of executive pay regulation is necessary to adequately 
account  for  this  discussion.  As  a  potential  starting  point  for  this  research, 
professional team sports leagues provide a unique laboratory for deriving insights on 
the  introduction,  workings,  and  consequences  of  the  regulation  of  executive 
compensation. We transfer these valuable insights to an analysis of executive pay 
regulation and illustrate what politicians, regulators, and economists can learn from 
major sports leagues. Key implications relate to the introduction, determining, and 
targeting  of  salary  caps  and  luxury  taxes,  the  discussion  of  luxury  taxes  as  an 
alternative to salary caps, as well as the rigor and enforcement of these regulatory 
mechanisms. 
With the derivation of implications from practice in major sports leagues we want to 
contribute to the discussion of executive pay regulation. We see our contribution as a 
new perspective, which merits attention because of the success and the long tradition 
of salary caps and luxury taxes in professional sports. However, we are aware that 
the discussion of insights cannot take place without pointing out the institutional 
differences between professional team sports and the corporate sector. Nevertheless, 
the valuable insights remain and can enrich the discussion of measures to regulate 
executive compensation with a new perspective.   22 
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